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The General Aviation Revitalization Act

THE GEMRAL A LTATIONREWTALIZATIONACT OF 1994:
AN OW3RWEW OF TORT REFORM
Alan J. Stolzer
The aviation industry, not yet a century old, has developed into one of the most robust, visible, and analyzed
industries in the world today.Despite its youth, aviation is a sizable industry, employing an estimated nearly 2.5 million
people (NewMyer, Kaps & Sharp, 1997), and generating $75 billion of economic activity in the United States (Kane,
1996).Its size, its importance in our society, and, unfortunately, the occasional mishap that occurs in aviation, cause the
industry to be constantly in the public eye. One can hardly watch the evening news or read a newspaper and not be
exposed to a story involving aviation. Ever present media coverage includes such topics as mergers, rightsizing,
bankruptcy, new aircraft and technologes, economic news, crashes, near misses, and legal actions. The latter of these,
legal actions, are not unique to the aviation industry, but one type of legal action, product liability claims against
manuf-ers,
were having a crippling effect on an important segment of aviation -- general aviation, according to Jack
Olcott, president of the National Business Arcraft Association ("Statement of John W. Olcote," 1993). To address this
phenomenon, the General Aviation Revitabation Act of 1994 (GARA) was signed into law on August 17,1994. GARA
is a federal statute of repose designed to protect aircraft manufacturers from the uncertainties and costs associated with
what has been termed "long tail" liability (Darwin, 1996). This paper will attempt to define the key terms, provide some
background of the general aviation i n w and the problem the law was designed to correct, explain the specifics of the
law -- what it does and does not do, and consider the effect of the law since its passage nearly four years ago.

--

DEFINITIONS

general aviation
generally referred to as all aviation
activities with the exception of military and air carrier
activity (Kane, 19%). A general aviation aircraft is an
aircraft: (1) for which the FAA @xiera1 Aviation
Administration] has issued a type or airworthiness
cdficate; (2) which carries fewer than 20 passengers;
and (3) which is not engaged in scheduled passenger
carrying operations (General Aviation Revitalization
Act of 1994).
joint and several liability A liability is said to be joint and
several when the creditor may sue one or more of the
parties to such liability separately, or all of them
together at his option (Black, 1983).
product liability -- refers to the legal liability of
manufacturers and sellers to compensate buyers, users,
and even bystanders, for damages or injuries suEered
because of defects in goods purchased. A tort which
makes a manufacturer liable if his product has a
defective condition that makes it unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer (Black, 1983).

--
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statute of limitations -- A statute prescribing limitations to
the right of action on certain described causes of action
or criminal prosecutions; that is, declaring that no suit
shall be maintained on such causes of action, nor any
criminal charge be made, unless brought within a
spdied periodof time after the right accrued. Statutes
of limitations are statutes of repose, and are such
legislative enactments as prescnie the periods within
which actions may be brought upon certain claims or
within which certain rights may be enforced (Black,
1983).
statute of repose -- see 'statute of limitations'
strict liability -- A concept applied by the courts in product
liability cases in which a seller is liable for any and all
defective or hazardous products which unduly threaten
a consumer's personal safety (Black, 1983). In almost
all states, a victim can hold a manufacturer or seller
"strictlyliable" if the plaintiff can prove that a defect in
the product was a cause of his injuries, even if the
injured person cannot prove neghgence by the
manufacturer (Kolczynski, 1997).

45
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tor-b-A private or civil wrong or injury, other than breach of

contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in
the form of an action for damages. Three elements of
every tort action are: Existence of legal duty from
defendant to plaintiff, breach of duty, and damage as
proximate result (Black, 1983).
BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM
General aviation is widely regarded as an important industry
in the United States. In 1991, following several years of
industry decline, general aviation generated some $42 billion
of economic activity, and employed more than 500,000
people with wages of more than $14 billion per year (Wilbur
Smith Associates as cited in Schrick, 1994). This sector of
aviation includes business travel almost all flight training,
business travel personal travel crop dusting, pipeline patrol,
and so on (Kane, 1996). The aircraft used in general aviation
are typically small aircraft in comparison to those used by air
carriers.
Twenty years ago, small aircraft were produced in
abundance. In 1978,companies such as Cessna, Piper, Beech,
Mooney and other U.S.-based aircraft manufacturers
produced 17,811 airplanes. Sixteen years later the number
produced had decreasedby 95% to a mere 928 airplanes. The
following table illustratesthe production levels fiom 1970 to
1997 (GAMA, 1997).
Annual Shivmats of New U.S. Manufadurd
General Aviation Aircraft bv Units Shivozd
Year

Units shipped

Year

Unib shipped

What caused the dramatic decline in airplanes shipped
beginning in the early 1980s? Opinions abound, but most
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agree that product liability played a major role. In a speech
before the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on
Public Works and Transportation, Jack Olcott, president of
the National Business Aircraft Association, made the
following statement ("Statement of John Olcott," 1993).
First, we are today experiencing real financial and
operational hardships as a result of this country's
product liabrltty laws, hardships that have hobbled a
once world-leading industry. Specifically, for us as
aircraft operators, the cost of maintaining the aircraft
we fly has risen substantially due to product liability
awards and the cost of their legal defense. As a
result, aircraft parts are, in many cases, much more
expenswe or simply not available. Piper Aircraft, for
example, which carries a long tail of liability
exposure as a result of over 70 successful years of
aircraft production, no longer is readily able to
supply parts for most of the more than 70,000 Piper
aircraft sfill flymg. Cessna, Beech and others are
similarly affected.
Many people believe that the current aviation tort system was
biased against the m a n u f a c m for two simple reasons. First,
manufacturers have been held liable for everythg they ever
built. There were an estimated 181,341 active general aviation
aircraft in 1996, and the average age of these aircraft was 28
years old (1997 StatisticalDatabook). One can easily imagine
the exposures the manufacturers have had to contend with
because these older airplanes are still in service. Second,
because of the joint and several liability laws of most states,
a party found even 1% at fault can be forced to pay an entire
judgment (Liability reform, 1997). This has led to aircraft
manufacturers being named in numerous suits, and having to
pay huge judgments, when their aircraft or components hardly
played a role in the crash.
OVERALL IMPACT OF TORTS
Liability law is an mqmtant aspect of our legal system. Tbis
law was intended to allow people with legitimate complaints
access to the justice system to redress their grievances.
Liability law, or tort law, affects society in many Werent
ways, such as shaping public policy, determining the
availability of products and services, and, ultimately,
impacting the economy.
Public Policy
Tort law affects public policy in ways most people do not
even consider. To give one example, as described by Victor

-

JAAER Winter 1998

2

Stolzer: The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994: An Overview of T

The GeneralAviation Revitalization Act

Schwartz, thirteen states allow a totally drunken person to
recover damages in tort law. They allow people who misuse
products to receive substantial awards. "Most Americans do
not want to subsidize stupid behavior, but they do not know
how this mysterious area of law works" (Schwartz, 1996).
Products and Services
There are countless examples of products that have been
removed h m the market, that never made it to the market at
all, or that experienced substantial price increases as a result
of product liability. Experts estimate that liability suits add
$500 to new car prices, $100 to the price of a $200 football
helmet, and $3,000 to the cost of a heart pacemaker. Also,
Washington D.C. girl scouts must sell 87,000 boxes of
cookies each year to pay for liabdity insurance. Finally, these
experts note that Little League Baseball's liability costs
increased 1,000% in only five years from $75 to nearly
$800 per league annually (Legal reform, 1997). In the general
aviation industry, a survey revealed that 47% of U.S.
manufacturers withdrew their products £?om markets, 39%
decided against introducing a new product, and 25%
discontinued new product research -- all for liability reasons
wane, 1996).
Economy
Liability suits cost the economy a substantial amount of
money each year, although the exact figure is dBicult to
determine. Some legal refom advocates calculate the cost to
the economy as a whole from liability suits at $300 billion a
year. ("Liability Reform", 1997). A more conservative figure
is cited on the majority whip web page which states that
America's 'tort tax' costs the economy $132 billion a year in
litigation and higher insurance premiums because of lawsuit
abuse (Legal reform, 1997). Whatever the actual figure, it is
clear that these suitshave a substantial negative impact on the
nation's economy.
NEGATIVE EFFECT OF LIABILITY ON GENERAL
AVIATION
While there are many negative effects of excessive liability,
a few of the more important ones include the affect on
insurance premiums, cost of aircraft, loss of jobs, the rise of
foreign aircraft to dominance in the market, and the lack of
research and development.
Insurance Premiums
Increased product liabilities have a number of negative
@its, paramount of which is the increased cost of insurance
and the resultant increase in the cost of the airplane. During

--

the 1980s, liability claims paid by the industry increased from
$24 d o n to more than $210 million (Sullivan, 1996). Why
did this happen? Michael P. Savin (1996), Claim Account
Manager for Reliance National Insurance, offers the following
opinion.
As we are all aware, the plaintifs bar became more
and more creative in their theories of liability, often
looking to the "deep pocket" to fill their coffers. In
the case of general aviation, that pocket was usually
located in the pants of the manufacturer, such as
Cessna, Prper Airaaft or Beech Aircraft. According
to the plaintifs bar, every aviation loss, whether
caused by failure of an uninsured component part, an
act of God or just plain pilot error could be
attributed to a design defect by the manufacturer.
This was disastrous for the industry. Jury awards in
excess of $10 million were all too common ... The
industry, which paid $24 million in premiums for
the 14,000 aircraft delivered in 1979, paid $200
million in 1993 when only 950 aircraft were
delivered.
Cost of Aircraft
The increase in insurance premiums described above had a
very predictable outcome the costs of the aircraft increased.
Liabilay insuranceadded an average of 30% to the cost of the
typical trainer aircraft as a result of the proliferation of
product liability lawsuits (Cunnington, 1997). This increase
in price made these aircraft unaffordable to many potential
buyers.
Loss of Jobs
Another important affect of the decline of general aviation
since the mid-1970s has been the substantial loss of jobs.
Acun-dmgto induslry information, employment in the general
aviation industry decreased by 65 percent. Cessna alone had
cut employment fiom 18,000 to approximately 3,000 (Price,
19%). Plper went fiwn 15,000 employees at its peak to 45 in
1991. AU told, over 100,000 manufacturing jobs were lost
between 1976 and 1986, and an additional 15,000 to 20,000
jobs were lost in related industries during the collapse of
general aviation (Savin, 1996).

--

Foreign Aircraft
Foreign aircraft manufactmencapitalized on the opportunity
to enter the U.S. market while the U.S. manufacturers either
refused to produce aircraft, or were unable to sell them due to
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high costs. For the most part, foreign manufacturers are not
subject to the same onerous liability problems that U.S.
manufacturers contend with. Manufacturers such as Zenaire,
Hoarc GmbH, Diamond Aircraft Industries, Aerospatiale and
others have increased their activity in the general aviation
market in the past several years.
Jack Olcott observed ("Statement of John W. Alcott," 1993),
"Cessna, P i and Beech used to produce a lion's share of the
world's training market. Today, because of our product
liability laws, France is now the leading supplier of training
aircraft in the U.S."
Research and Development
One of the factors cited often as a negative affect of
excessive liability costs is the lack of research and
development occurring in the industry. Clearly, most of the
investment into research and development ceased when the
cost of liability insurance increased. Research and
development was just beginning during that time fkame into
such areas as Global Positioning Systems, composite
cow&u&on, more intelligent cockpits, computer monitoring
of engine systems, and others. As one observer (Stewart,
1995) put it, "This has reduced the quality of the aircraft
produced as well as the development of technologies within
the aviation field" Drew Steketee, senior vice president of the
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, stated that when the
production of piston-engine planes stalled in the U.S.,
research and development did too. "There's been almost no
new technology introduced in piston-engine aircraft since the
Piper Malibu in the early 80s," according to Steketee (Bremer,
1995). Dave Franson, vice president for Cessna, stated
(Bremer, 1995) that his company was spending as much
defending itself in lawsuits in the mid-80s when it ceased
production of light aircraft as it was spending on research and
development This lack of investment was certainly illustrated
in 1997when Cessna produced its first model 172 aircraft in
10 years, and it was substantially unchanged fiom the
previous model.

FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS
While many of the lawsuits against general aviation aircraft
and component manufacturers are certady reasonable efforts
to remedy legitimate complaints, some clearly do not fit that
description. Following are some brief descriptions of several
lawsuits many consider frivolous and inappropriate.
A Piper airplane was involved in an accident due to
maintenance problems. It crashed and caught on fire on
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the side of the road. A lady stopped to see the fire, and
when she stopped, someone hit her ffom behind. She
sued Piper simply because Piper had 'created' a nuisance
on the side of the road and made her stop. The case was
thrown out of court, but it still cost Piper $100,000 in
legal expenses (Cunnington, 1997).
A Piper aircraft was used in the making of a movie. The pilot
was doing the filming while seated backward in the
plane. The plane crashed and the pilot sued Piper on the
grounds that it made an unsafe airplane with poor
backseat visibility (Sullivan, 1996). A $2.5 million
judgment was made in favor of the pilot.
Cessna Aircraft was sued and paid thousands of dollars to a
pilot who crashed his Cessna 195 due to water in a fuel
tank. The airplane had been parked outside during four
days of very heavy Florida rains, and had failed to use the
wing tank drains to remove the water fkom the tanks
("Statement of John W. Olcott," 1993).
o A pilot crashed an illegally overloaded two-seat training
aircraft into a building at an airport. A third occupant of
the airplane, a small boy not seated in a seat with a
restraint belt, sustained a brain injury when he was
thrown through the windshield and struck his head on a
steel beam inside the building. The pilot defaulted on a
$750,000 judgment against hm,so Cessna was sued and
ordered to pay $1 million to the injured boy ("Statement
of John W. Olcott," 1993).
Unison
Industries, makers of aircraft ignition systems,
n
incurred $10,000 in legal expenses clearing its name in
a Hawaii crash case where its product was not even on
the aircraft ("Statement of John W. Olcott," 1993).
Piper spent nearly $1 million in legal fees to defend itself
in a crash case where the pilot of a Super Cub tested
positive for cocaine ("Statement of John W. Olcott,"
1993).
Cessna and several component manufacturers were sued
for $4.5 million in a case involving a drunken pilot. The
pilot crashed an airplane after experiencing fuel
exhaustion. Three hours after the crash, the pilot's blood
alcohol level was 0.2%. The FAA allows a maximum of
0.04%. The suit was settled for $50,000 following 4
years of @tion ("Statement of John W. Olcott," 1993).
THE ACT
In the early 1980s, a concerted effort was begun to compel
Congress to draft and pass a bdl to reform the tort law as it

a
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applied to general aviation. The legal reform advocates felt
that the bill should be based on a "statute of repose," a
measure used to reduce the length of time a manufacturer
could be held liable for defects. Predictably, the Association
of Trail Lawyers of America opposed the legislation arguing
that it would take away consumers' rights to seek redress for
their grievances (JSane, 1996).
Finally, Senator Nancy Kassebaum introduced the bdl on
September 14, 1993, along with 51 co-sponsors (S. 1458,
1993). The official title as introduced to the Senate was "A
bill to amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to establish
time limitations on certain civil actions against aircraft
manufacturers, and for other purposes." The short title as
introduced was "General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1993"
(changed to "... 1994" as enacted).
The General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA) effectively
shields the manufacturers of aircraft and their component
parts from liability lawsuits that arise more than 18 years after
the aircraft (or part, component, or subassembly) is first
manufactured and delivered to a customer (Darwin,1996).
(The full text of GARA is included as Appendix A.) GARA
applies only to general aviation aircraft, and contains four
express exceptions to its 18-year statute of repose.
The manufacturer knowingly misrepresents or conceals
certain safety information to or ffom the FAA;
The claimant was a passenger for purposes of receiving
medical or emergency treatment;
The claimant who suffers harm was not aboard the aircraft at
the time of the accident; and
The claimant's cause of action is based on the manufacturers
Written warranties.
If the plaintiff is able to plead and prove any one of these
exceptions, he or she can successfully avoid GARA's
restrictions (Darwin, 1996).

LEGISLATIVE PROGRESS OF BILL
The bill was introduced on September 14, 1993, and was
signed into law by the President on August 17, 1994 a
relatively short time by legislative standards. It is particularly
noteworthy that the bill was signed by President Clinton who
had, upon taking office, vowed to veto any reform that crossed
his desk (Boyer, 1996).
The bill had 5 1 co-sponsors in the Senate, while the House
version had 280 co-sponsors. In the end, 91 Senators voted
for the bill. A synopsis of the progress of the bill through the
U.S. Congress is contained in Appendix B (Thomas U.S.

--

-

Congress on the Internet, 1994).
The amendments referenced above mainly centered on the
limitation Mod.For example, the June 26, 1994, 'Engrossed
House Amendment' version of the bill (S. 1458 EAH, 1994)
provided for varying limitations periods depending on the
item in question.
(3) the term 'limitation period' means-15 years with respect to piston-powered general
aviation aircraft and the components,
systems, subassemblies, and other parts of
the aircraft,
18 years with respect to turboprop-powered
general aviation aircraft and the components,
systems, subassemblies, and other parts of
such aircraft, and
22 years with respect to the other general aviation
aircraft (including jet-powered general
aviation aircraft) and the components,
systems, subassemblies, and other parts of
such aircraft, and
An August 2, 1994, Senate amendment to the bill
consolidated these varying time limitations into an 18 year
limitation period for all three categories of general aviation
aircraft.

EFFECT OF THE ACT
Since it became law less than 4 years ago, a detailed analysis
of the effect of GAR4 would be difficult. Clearly, the general
aviation industry is recovering, however, the amount of the
recovery that is attributable to GARA is unknown. Following
are same idonnation and data that may shed some light on the
immediate impact of the law.
"Thanks to GARA the general aviation industry is in better
shape today than it has been at any time in well over a
decade," states the General Aviation Manufacturers
Association (GAMA, 1996). Employment has increased each
year since GARA became law. In addition, as noted in the
preceding table, the production of general aviation aircraft in
the United States has also increased each year since GARA
became law. GAMA (1996) states that the total increase in
general aviation production since enactment is over 69%, and
the production of single engine piston-powered aircraft has
increased over 103%.
The immediate effect on the manufacturers was signd5cant.
Reports Reliance National Insurance Company, "At the time
of its passage, GARA extinguished liability on 60% of all
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general aviation aircraft ... a number which increases to over
70% when only single engine aircraft are included" (Savin,
1996). And, as each year passes and aircraft from the big
production years of the 1970s and early 1980s fall under the
protection of GARA, the exposure of manufacturers to
liability lawsuits will decline even further.
In a report to the President and Congress, The Results of the
General Aviation Revitalization Act (1996), GAMA estimates
that tens of thousands of new jobs will be created over the
next ~e years as a result of GARA. According to the report,
over 9,000 jobs have been created since 1994. Further, the
report states that research and development has resumed in
earnest, and optimism of the pilot community is improved
dramaticaw.
If not for GARA, the top two manufacturers of light general
aviation aircraft would not be producing airplanes today.
Russell Meyer, Jr., Chairman and CEO of Cessna Aircraft
Company, stated, "The product liability environment
practically killed an important segment of the aviation
industry. The cost of defending lawsuit after lawsuit caused
us, by 1986, to stop building piston-engine aircraft" ("The
Results of the General Aviation Revitalization Act," 1996).
Charles Suma, President and CEO of the New Piper Aircraft,
concurs, "There is not a single company, government agency
or individual ... that knows the sigdicance of GARA more
than The New Piper Aircraft, Inc., and myself. If there is a
doubt in anyone's mind of the effect of this landmark
legislation, we are living proof. We are The New Piper
because of GARA and its limiting effect on the enormous
product liability tail" (Suma, 1996).
David k o n , former FAA Administrator summed it up by
stating, "There is widespread agreement that the General
Aviation Revitalization Act is having its intended effect,"
("The Results of the General Aviation Revitalization Act,"
1996).
CASE LAW SINCE GARA
The effect of the courts on GARA has yet to be established.
According to attorney Edward Booth, the first appellate
decisions inteqmting GARA began appearing in 1996. Booth
(1998) cites the following cases that involved GARA.
Cartmanv. Textron Lycoming. The plaintiff was injured in an
aircraft accident in 1992. It was alleged that the plane
crashed due to a faulty carburetor float installed in 1966.
The plaintiffs allegations of a defective carburetor raised
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when an amended complaint was filed in 1995. The court
ruled for the defendants. However, the court ruled that
since the original complaint was filed before the
enactment of GARA, the amendment does not "relate
back." The court also ruled that the plaintiff did not
sat& the "knowing misrepresentation or concealment"
exception because the argument was not sufficiently
specific in proving that the defendant concealed
information fiom the FAA.
Altseimerv. Bell Helicopter. A helicopter crashed due to
a defective gearbox, which was manufactured more than
18 years prior to the crash. Summary judgment was
granted for defendants since the action was fded after
GARA became law.
o Alterv. Bell Helicopter. A helicopter crashed in a foreign
country due to the alleged failure of an engine
compressor stator vane. The helicopter and its engine
were more than 18 years old. Plaintiffs argue for an
exception to GARA due to the following: the
maintenance manuals were issued within the 18 year
limitation; the accident occurred in a foreign country;
maintenance manuals were a "product" and that their
issuance within the repose period recommenced the
nmning of the statute of repose. The court rejected each
of those arguments.
o Rickert v. Mitsubishi. A 2 1 year old airplane crashed to
due to alleged design defects and controllability issues.
The court found in favor of the defendant, until it later
discovered that the defendant had been less than
forthcoming with its discovery process. The court will
reconsider the motion of summaryjudgment.
Wnght v. Bond-Air, Ltd. A 28 year old airplane crashed
killing the plaintiff. The defendants sought to move the
case to a federal court claiming that the action arises
under federal law due to GARA. The court disagreed
stating that GARA. does not confer federal jurisdiction
upon state court claims, not does it create a federal cause
of action. The case was remanded back to state court.
ACT REFUTED
In most complex issues there are differing opinions, and
GARA is no exception There are some people who refute the
impact of GARA and, to be sure, there are other factors
involved in the revitalization of the industry.
To quote Charles Suma (1996), "Today's marketplace and
economy are substantially different than in the 1970s, when
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this sector of General Aviation produced in excess of 145,000
aircraft in 10 years. The majority of these are stiU in use
today, worldwide." Suma contends that many factors are
Werent now, such as: the loss of investment tax credits; the
ehbation of the accelerated depreciation; insurance costs for
owners, operators and manufacturers are substantially higher
and do not track with inflation; fuel costs have escalated at a
higher rate than inflation; the decline in middle-class
consumers and their ability to purchase products; the cessation
of the G.I. bill; the long life of the product; and the risk of
over-production. These remarks were intended to describe the
considerations manufacturers must take into account as they
resume production, but one could also argue that these factors,
all unfavorable toward aircraft production, led to the downturn
in the industry.
Some do not think GARA is responsible for the revitalization
of the industry. One attorney who has studied the effect of
GARA notes that small airplane prices have not dropped as
the general aviation industry promised, because the industry
has &ed no product liability 'savings' due to GARA ("The
General Aviation Revitalization Act," 1998). In fact, a new
Moaney single engine airplane that sold for % 165,000 in 1994
is selling for $209,000 in 1997. A new Piper Saratoga that
sold for $209,000 in 1991 is priced at $349,999 today. The
same can be said for Cessna aircraft and those produced by
other manufactims. On March 6,1997, the Subcommittee on
Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the
Senate Committeeon Commerce, Science and Transportation,
held oversight hearings on the results of the GARA. As John
Moore, Cessna's senior vice president, acknowledged before
that Senate committee,Cessna has experienced no decrease in
their product liability k m c e costs. "Therefore, no cost
savings have been passed along to consumers, as
manufactures promised would occur," states Public Citizen
("The General Aviation RevitalizationAct," 1998).
A writer (Clifford, 1994) for Chicago Lawyer newsletter
believes that product liability is merely being made the
scapegoat for mistakes the industry has made. According to
Clifford, "The real culprit are the general aviation
manufacturers themsehres who made questionable business
judgments, having saturated the market with products that are
built for a long life expectancywithout adequately considering
the safety consequences...They did not face their day of
reckoning when they had glutted the market while the new
sales market had collapsed." CHord argued that reform

would actually shift the burden of catastrophic injury and
death to innocent victims and their families. Finally, he
believes that the real issue for Congress to examine is that of
liability insurance,contending that the insurance indusby uses
exaggerated claims to justify rate increases.
Public Citizen argues thaf contrary to popular belief, product
habilrty litigation remains rare in this country and is not out of
control. According to the National Center for State Courts
(NCSC) (as cited in "The facts about product liability
lawsuits," 1998), only .0036% of all civil case filings in state
courts involve products liability suits. Further, a 1995
collaborative study by the NCSC and the Bureau of Justice
Statistics of the U.S. Department of Justice (as cited in "The
facts about product liability lawsuits," 1998) reveals that
products liabilrty suits comprise only about 3% of all civiljury
trials.
While acknowledging that there has been a modest increase
in demand for small aircraft, some observers argue that this is
a result of variables other than GARA. Replacement of aging
air& and improved marketing efforts are cited by several as
being the main reason for the increased production. Hal
Wight, AAE., manager of airports for Contra Costa County,
California, stated "Two of my flight training tenants are
actually doing quite welL Both of them have had a pretty good
turnaround I don't think it has anything to do with the product
liability thing. I think the businesses, FBOs and airports have
learned to selltheir proctuct"' (Bremer, 1995). Wight predicted
that there will not be a sales boom for new aircraft. He feels
that even though it may be unpopular to say so, studies have
shown there isn't a pent up demand for new general aviation
aircraft. "The number of airplanes that are still in the fleet is
stiU adequate for the number of people who want to fly," said
Wight. (Bremer, 1995)
Ollie Cramer, an airport manager at Manassas (Virginia)
&arguing that the uptum in the economy has had more
effect than anything product liability legislation did. "More
people now have the money to start or complete their flight
training," said Cramer (Bremer, 1995).
CONCLUSION
It is not diilicult to cite statistics that indicate that general
aviation has experienced revitalization since the enactment of
GARA. Production of aircraft is up, employment has
increased, and there is strong evidence of si@cant research
and development occurring in the industry. One could argue,
though, that the turnaromd is based largely on the
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expectations of what GARA will do as opposed to what it has
done. The expectations of what GARA will do have changed
the mood of the industry. After citing numerous statistics
detailing the resurgence in the industry, David Burner,
president of BF Goodrich Aerospace, said profoundly, "More
importantly [than other factors], there is a strong conviction
and determinationthat the general aviation industry is back on
a growth track (Non-Hub, 1995). As stated in the The
Results o f the General Aviation Revitalization Act, "The
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Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), the world's

largest pilot organization, reports optimism of the pilot
comm*
is better today than in recent history." A dramatic
shift took place following the passage of the General Aviation
Revitalization Act ("The Results of the General Aviation
Revitalization Act," 1996).It is evident that GARA not only
reformed tort law for general aviation, it also revived the
optimism of those involved in the industry.n
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APPENDIX A
General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994
General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (Enrolled Bill (Sent to President))
--S. 145%One Hundred Third Congress
of the
United States of America
AT THE SECOND SESSION
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, the twenty-fifth day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-four
An Act
To amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to establish time limitations on certain civil actions against aircraft manufacturers,
and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994'.
SEC. 2. TIME LIMITATIONS ON CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURERS.
(a) IN GENERAL- Except as provided in subsection (b), no civil action for damages for death or injury to persons or
damage to property arising out of an accident involving a general aviation aircraft may be brought against the manufacturer of the
aircraft or the manufacturer of any new component, system, subassembly, or other part of the aircraft, in its capacity as a
manufacturer if the accident occurred-(1) after the applicable limitation period beginning on-(A) the date of delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser or lessee, if delivered directly from the
manufacturer; or
(B) the date of first delivery of the aircraft to a person engaged in the business of selling or leasing such
aircraft, or
(2) with respect to any new component, system, subassembly, or other part which replaced another component, system,
subassembly, or other part originally in, or which was added to, the aircraft, and which is alleged to have caused such death,
injury, or damage, after the applicable limitation period beginning on the date of completion of the replacement or addition.
(b) EXCEPTIONS- Subsection (a) does not apply-(1) if the claimant pleads with specificity the facts necessary to prove, and proves, that the manufacturer with respect to
a type certificate or airworthiness c&cate for, or obligations with respect to continuing airworthiness of, an aircraft or a
component, system, subassembly, or other part of an aircraft knowingly misrepresented to the Federal Aviation Administration,
or concealed or withheld from the Federal Aviation Administration, required information that is material and relevant to the
performance or the maintenance or operation of such aircraft, or the component, system, subassembly, or other part, that is
causally related to the harm which the claimant allegedly &ered;
(2) if the person for whose injury or death the claim is being made is a passenger for purposes of receiving treatment for
a m d c a l or other emergency;
(3) if the person for whose injury or death the claim is being made was not aboard the aircraft at the time of the accident;
or
(4) to an action brought under a written warranty enforceable under law but for the operation of this Act.
O GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT DEFINED- For the purposes of h s Act, the term 'general aviation aircraft'
means any aircraft for which a type certificate or an airworthiness 6 c a t e has been issued by the Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration, which, at the time such certificate was originally issued, had a maximum seating capacity of fewer than
20 passengers, and which was not, at the time of the accident, engaged in scheduled passenger-carrying operations as defined
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under regulations in effect under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. App. 1301 et seq.) at the time of the accident.
(d) RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER LAWS- This section supersedes any State law to the extent that such law permits a
civil action described in subsection (a) to be brought after the applicable limitation period for such civil action established by
subsection (a).
SEC. 3. OTHER DEFINITIONS.
For purposes of this Act-(1) the term 'aircraft' has the meaning given such term in section 101(5) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C.
130l(5));
(2) the term 'airworthiness certificate' means an airworthiness certificate issued under section 6030 of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1423(c)) or under any predecessor Federal statute;
(3) the term 'limitation period' means 18 years with respect to general aviation aircraft and the components, systems,
subassemblies, and other parts of such aircraft; and
(4) the term 'type certificate' means a type cdcate issued under section 603(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
(49 U.S.C. 1423(a)) or under any predecessor Federal statute.
SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF ACT.
(a) EFFECTIVE DATE- Except as provided in subsection (b), this Act shall take effect on the date of the enactment of
this Act.
(b) APPLICATION OF ACT- This Act shall not apply with respect to civil actions commenced before the date of the
enactment of this Act.
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Vice President of the United States and
President of the Senate.
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APPENDIX B
Legislative
Promess of GARA Throud Conmess (Thomas - U.S. Conmess on the Internet. 1994).
Senate:
9/14/93 Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce.
Committee on Commerce. Ordered to be reported without amendment favorably.
1119/93
Committee on Commerce. Reported to Senate without amendment. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar.
11/20/93
Measure laid before Senate by unanimous consent. The bill was modified by unanimous consent. Referred to
3/9/94
the Committee on Judiciary by unanimous consent. Senate Committee on Judiciary discharged. Placed on
Senate Legislative Calendar.
Measure laid before Senate by unanimous consent. Passed Senate as modified without amendment by Yea-Nay
3/16/94
Vote. 91-8.
Message on Senate action sent to the House.
3/17/94
Message on House action received in Senate and at desk: House amendment to Senate bill.
6/29/94
Measure laid before Senate by unanimous consent. Amendment SP 2440 agreed to in Senate by voice vote.
8/2/94
Message on Senate action sent to the House.
8/3/94
House:
Referred jointly to the House Committee on Judiciary.
3118/94
Referred to the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law.
3/23/94
Subcommittee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held. Forward by Subcommittee to Full Committee
6116/94
(amended) by voice vote.
Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held. Ordered to be Reported (amended).
6/2 1/94
Reported to House (Amended) by House Committee on Judiciary.
6/24/94
Referred jointly to the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation.
3/18/94
Referred to the Subcommittee on Aviation.
313 1/94
Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held. Ordered to be reported by voice vote. Subcommittee on
5117/94
Aviation discharged.
Reported to House by House Committee on Public Works and Transportation.
5/24/94
6/24/94
Placed on Union Calendar.
Called up by House under suspension of the rules. Passed House (amended) by voice vote.
6/27/94
Executive:
8/3/94
Cleared for White House.
8/5/94
Presented to President.
Signed by President. Became Public Law No: 103-298.
8117/94
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